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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF U~fAH

NEWELL J. OLSEN, operating under
the name and style of NEWELL J.
OLSEN & SONS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

ROLAND A. REESE,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
g I\
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j

..

S-'1'

A 1~ _J ~~
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Q . L G. DAINES,
DAINES,

LMLos

\948Attorneys for Defendant
and~spondent.

CLiiK:&uiR£t:\i-o-auiT.-utAH
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
:L\E\VELL J. OLSEN, operating under
the name and style of NEWELL J.
OLSEN & SONS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

ROLAND A. REESE,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant in his statement of facts and throughout his brief, has, contrary to the pleadings, asserted that
his action is one based on quantum merit instead of one
based on a written contract, which is the case. He has
also taken the position that the respondent herein claimed
nothing for his demurrer filed in the City Court. This
assertion is also unfounded. To the foregoing, the respondent takes exception. (Tr. 5, 6 and 7.)
For the purpose of clarity in setting forth respondent's position, he is herein setting forth the pertinent
parts of appellant's complaint. These are as follows:
2. That on or about the 20th day of March, 1946,
the plaintiff and defendant made and entered into
an agreement by which plaintiff agreed to build a
basement apartment for defendant in his home at
3rd North and 4th East Street, Logan City, specifically agreeing to do and construct certain specific
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and stated items, and further agreeing that "any
alterations shall be paid for as extra work." Said
agreement is in words and figures as follows:

BUILDING AGREEMENT
This building agreement made and entered into this
20th day of March A.D. 1946, by and between Mr.
Roland Reese, as first party, and Newell J. Olsen,
operating under the name of Newell J. Olsen & Sons,
as second party, WITNESSETH:
That for and in consideration of the sum of $1,150.00,
to be paid in cash by first party at the rate of 65%
as the work is done, balance when finished, second
party hereby agrees to build .a basement apartment for
first party, furnishing all necessary labor and materials, exclusive of all plumbing, and all wiring.
Second party more particularly agrees to do the
following: ~ ~ ~
Any additional work shall be paid for by first party
as parties hereto shall later agree upon. Any alterations shall be paid for by first party as extra work.
Second party shall also furnish all hardware and
shall do all work in a good and workmanlike manner.

Is/ ROLAND A.-REESE,
First Party
Is/ NEWELL J. OLSEN,
Second Party.
3. That plaintiff has fully performed his said agreement, has furnished all material and done all the work
and labor, as called for in said agreement, except
defendant furnished one door for which he is enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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titled to a credit of $5.00, and except also, plaintiff
did not put in wooden floor, for which defendant
is entitled to an agreed credit of $150.00, which left
a balance due and owing to the plaintiff on said
specified items mentioned in the contract of $995.00
4. That in addition to performing the specific items
mentioned in the contract, the plaintiff also, at the
special instance and request of defendant, or defendant's wife, made and performed n1any alterations,
for which plaintiff is entitled to pay as extra work,
which are as follows: # # #"'
(Tr. 5, 6 and 7.)
To appellant's complaint, the respondent filed a
general demurrer in the City Court of Logan City, which
the City Court overuled. (Tr. 10 and 11.)
On the 20th day of February, 1948, a jury was empanelled to try the above case, and the appellant was
sworn and testified. Among other things he testified that
he was a general contractor having engaged in such business for about three years. ( Tr. 62, 85.)
During cross examination of the appellant it was
stipulated by his counsel that at the date of the execution
of the contract set out in appellant's complaint, that he,
the appellant, did not have a contractor's license as is
required by 79-5a-1 of the Utah Code Annoted 1943.
(Tr. 92 and 93.)
Upon motion of counsel for the respondent, the District Court dismissed the applellant's complaint on the
grounds that the appellant failed to prove that at the
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time of the execution of the contract sued upon, he was a
licensed contractor in the State of Utah, and upon the
further ground that the complaint did not state a cause
of action. (Tr. 94.)
The appellant did not request or ask leave of the
Court to amend his complaint after the trial.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
The District Court did· not err in dismissing the
appellant's complaint and its judgment should be sustained. From a reading of the appellant's complaint it
is apparent on its face that he has declared upon a written
agreement and not quantum meruit as appellant asserts
throughout his brief. (Tr. 5, 6, 7.)
The appellant in his complaint failed to state a cause
of action and it is fatally defective for the following
reasons:
1. That inasmuch as appellant is a contractor within
the provisions of chapter 5, title 79, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, his failure to allege and plead in his complaint that
he had fully complied with the requirements of the license
law and that he was a duly licensed contractor as required
by the laws of this State, or the reason, if any, why no
license was required, rendered his complaint fatally defective, and
2. Appellant failed to allege and plead that he had
performed all of the conditions precedent required in
said contract by him to be performed or the excuse for
non-performance.
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NECESSITY OF LICENSE
During the trial of appellant's case, his own evidence
affirmativelY showed that at the time of the execution
and entering into of the written agreement declared upon
by the appellant that he did not have a contractors license
as required by the laws of this State, the contract was thus
null and void.
As aforementioned, the appellant was a contractor
within the provisions of the laws of this state and that
his failure to have a license and to be so licensed and to
allege in his complaint that he was so licensed, or the
reason why no license was necessary rendered his complaint fatally defective.
The statutory provisions applicable and pertinent to
this case are as follows:
<C79-5a-l.

License to do Business.

It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, copartnership, corporation, association, or other organization,
or any combination of any thereof, to engage in the
business or act in the capacity of contractor within
this state without having a license therefor, as herein
provided 0 0 0

79-5a-3.

«Contractor'~'

Defined.

A contractor within the meaning of this act is a
person ° 0 0 , who for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensation other than wages,
undertakes with another for the construction, alteraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion, repair, addition to or improvement of any building 79-5a-4. Licenses - Application for - Fee Qualifications - Rules and Regulations.
Any person, ~ ~ 0 desiring to obtain a license under
this act shall make application in writing, ~ ~ ~ No
license shall be issued until the department of registration is satisfied upon evidence presented and recorded as to the integrity of the applicant and that
said applicant is qualified in the following respects to
hold a license:"
( 1)

That the applicant is of good reputation;

( 2) That the applicant has never been refused
a license or had a license revoked for reasons that
should preclude the granting of the license applied
for 0 ~ ~
79-5a-6. Unprofessional Conduct - Complaint Hearings - Appeal to District Court.
Any person ~ ~ ~ may file a duly certified complaint with the department of registration charging
that a licensee is guilty of one or more of the following acts or omissions: ~ ~ o
~ If the department of registration's decisior.
be that the license has been guilty of any such acts
or omissions, it may suspend or cancel the contractors
license ~ 0 ~
0

0

79-5a-10. Violation of Act - Penalty.
Any person o o o acting in the capacity of a contractor within the meaning of this act, without a
license as herein provided, shall upon conviction
thereof, if a person, be punished by a fine of not to
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exceed five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in
the county jail for a term not to exceed six months,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the dis4
cretion of the court.
i)

i)

In the ca:se of Dow et.al v. United States for the Use
and benefit of Holley, 154 Fed. 2d. 707, the Court said:
The Federal Court in construing the foregoing act
held that it was passed by legislature under its police
power for the protection of the publc, and that the contractors of unlicensed contractors could not be enforced.
Although Chapter 5a of Title 79 (Contractors) has
not been interpreted by this Court, it has been by the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth District.
«The remaining question concerns itself with the
right of Holley to maintain the action. At the time
the subcontract was entered into and at the time
the work was done under it, he did not have a license
by the State of Utah authorizing him to engage in
the trade or occupation of a contractor. Title 79,
Utah Code 1943, has reference generally to licenses
issued by the Department of Registration for engaging in certain businesses or professions. Section 791-38 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person
to practice or engage in the practice of any profession,
trade, or occupation subject to the department without authority so to do as provided in the title. Section 79-5a-l makes it unlawful for any person, firm,
copartnership, corporation, association, or other organization to engage in the business or act in the
capacity of contractor within the state without having a license therefor as therein provided, unless
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such persons, firm, corporation, association, or other
organization is particularly exempted by the act.
Section 79-5a-2 provides certain exemptions but they
do not have bearing here. The presently material
part of section 79-5a-3 provides that a contractor
shall include any person who for a fixed sum or
price, other than wages, undertakes for another any
excavation, and that the term contractor, as used
in the act, shall include subcontractor. Section 795a-4 deals with the making of applications for licenses
as a contractor and the issuance of such licenses.
And section 79-5a-10 provides a penalty for acting
in the capacity, of a contractor without having a
license. Neither these statutory provisions nor any
others called to our attention provide in express
language that a contract employing an unlicensed
contractor to perform services falling within the field
of his trade shall be unenforceable. But the statutory
requirements to obtain a license before engaging in
the trade is a police regulation for the protection of
the public, Smith, v. American Packing & Provision
Co. 102 Utah 351, 130 P. 2d. 951; a penalty is provided for the violation of the statutory exaction;
and it is the well settled general rule that in ordinary
circumstances, a contract entered into by an unlicensed person in contravention of the statutory
provisions of this kind will not be enforced. Wedge
wood v. Jorgens) 190 :Mich. 620, 157 N.W. 360;
Hickey v. Sutton, 191 Wis. 313, 210 N.W. 704; Sherwood v. Wise, 132 Wash. 295, 232 P. 309, 42 A.L.R.
1219; Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 P. 112;
American Store Equipment & Construction Corporation v. Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl, Inc., 283 N.Y.
601, 28 N.E. 2nd. 23; Massie v. Dudley, 173, Va. 42,
3 S.E. 2d. 176; Board of Education v. Elliott, 276,
Ky. 790, 125 S.W. 2nd 733."
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The Supreme Court of this State in the case of Anderson Ys. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 160 P. 2d. 275, construed
chapter 2 of title 82, Utah Code Annotated 1943, our
statutory provisions regulating real estate brokers and real
estate salesmen. This act is similar to the statute in
question. This court, in an opinion by Justice Turner held
that such statutes were enacted under the police powers
of the state and for the protection of the public. The
Court said:
"It is apparent that the statutes were enacted, not to
provide revenue, but to provide for registration and
regulation of those engaged in the real estate business. The license fee is so nominal that no other
conclusion is tenable. In Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8
Cal. App. 2d. 634, 48 P. 2d. 104, 107, Justice Crail
stated: "The primary purpose of the Real Estate
Brokers' Act was to require real estate brokers and
salesmen to be 'honest, truthful and of good reputation:"'

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Hickey
et.al v. Sutton, 210 N.W. 704, held that a contract entered
into by an unlicensed architect as required by the statutes
of this state was void. The Court said:
"The only conflicting authorities with reference to
the rule that the failure to procure license bars
recovery for services rendered is in those cases where
the statute which requires a license as a revenue
measure and not for the protection of the public.
There is no conflict in the authorities upon the rules
that the failure to procure a license bars recovery
where the license is enacted as a police measure for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the protection of the public. The rule applies with
equal force whether the requirement is sought upon
a written contract or quantum meruit. If the necessity of procuring a license could be avoided by neglecting to make the contract and those recovering
upon quantum meruit, an easy way out would be
found to nullify the contract.
It is not necessary that the pleadings should raise
the question that the appellant has not procured the
license required."

In the construction of a staute similar to ours, the
Supreme Court of Virginia in the case of Massie vs. Dudley, 3 S.E. 2d. 176, said:
"It is a well settled principle of law that the Courts
will not be a part to enforce an agreement made
in furtherance of objects forbidden by statutes or
by common law, or general policy of law, or to recover damages for its breach, or when the agreement
has been executed in whole or in part by payment
or money to recover it back # # # The law refuses
to enforce illegal contracts, as a rule, not out of
regard for the party objecting, nor for any wish to
protect his interest, but from reasons of public policy.
When even, therefore, the illegality of the contract
appears whether alleged in the pleadings or made
known for the first time in the evidence, it is fatal
to the case # # # The law not enforce contracts
founded in its violations."

To the same effect are the following cases: Board
of Education et. al v. Ellitt 125 S.W. 2d. 733. Wedge·
wood v. Jorgens 137 N.W. 360.
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The American Store Equipment & Construction Corporation, Appellant v. Jack Dempsey's Punch Bowl,
Inc. 28 N .E. 2d. 23.
Boxer v. Schroeter et. al. 7 N. 2d. 262.
Yocum 31 N. E. 2d. 652.

Maddox v.

Kirkman et. al. v. Borzag 150 P. 2d. 3.
Phillips v.

~1cintosh

et.al. 124 P. 2d. 835.

As pointed out by the foregoing authorities, when a
statute declares that it shall be unlawful to perform
certain acts, without a license, and imposes a penalty
for violation; contracts for such acts are necessarily
In this respect
void and incapable of enforcement.
our statutes present a stronger case for these being
within the State police. power and for the protection of
the public in that they provide that such contracts
are not only unlawful and provide a penalty for their
violation but they also provide among other things
that the department of registration, before issuing
a license, must find the apllicant to be a person of good
reputation and integrity, that he has never been refused
a license or had a license revoked for good reason. ( 79Sa-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943.) Our act further provides that a license may be revoked for professional misconduct. (79-5a-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.) In
view of the foregoing can it be said that our act is not
for the protection of the public, and passed as a police
measure?
That the appellant is a contractor within the provision of Title 79-5a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is
apparent from the face of the complaint, for in the contract set out therein it declares:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"This building agreement <t <t <t for and in consideration of the sum of $1150.00 to be paid in cash by the
first party at the rate of 65% as the work is done,
balance when finished, the second party agrees to
build a basement apartment for first party, furnishing
all necessary labor and materials >0 >0 >0 Any additional work shall be paid for by first part as parties
hereto shall later agree upon. Any alterations shall
be paid for by first party as extra work." (Tr. 5 and
6.)
We call your attention to the pertinent part of 795a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943:
"Contractor'~'

Defined.

A contractor within the meaning of this act is a
person >0 >0 >0 who fo ra fixed sum, fee percentage
or other compensation other than wages, undertakes
with another for the construction, alteration, repair,
addition to or improvement of any building >0 ° 0
other than to personalty, or any part thereof 0 0 ~~<"
That the appellant is a contractor within the meaning of the act is plain as the consideration for the services
to be rendered and the materials furnished was fixed,
except as to extras and this was to be agreed upon by
the parties. The only exception which takes a person
out of the act as a cantractor is when the compensation
received is in wages. The appellant in suing for the extras
which the appellant alleged he furnished, did not sue for
wages but for what he regarded as a proper cost for labor
and materials. Wages are paid for at an hourly, weekly
or monthly rate, and appellant's claim here is not based
upon any such a basis.
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PLEADINGS
As the appellant herein is a contractor within the
provisions of chapter 5a, title 79, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, and he is seeking to recover for services rendered
as such, he must allege facts which show that he was
licensed at the time that the contract was entered into
or that he was exempted therefrom, and in failing to do
so, he did not state a cause of action. (Tr. 5 and 6.)
The Supreme Court of this state in the case of Smith
vs. American Packing Provision Company, 102 Utah 351,
130 P. 2d, 951, has so ruled. This was the case in which
an action was brought by an architect for services rendered, the licensing of which is also controlled by title 79,
Utah Code Annotated 1943. In an opinion written by
Justice McDonough, the Court said:
"'The appellant contends that all of the matters raised
by the defendant constitute matters of defence which
plaintiff does not have to negative. However, the
general n1le is that where a person seeks recovery
for professional services for which a license is required as a condition precedent to the r~ndition of
such services for a fee, such person must allege and
prove facts, which show he was licensed at the time
such services were performed, so that he was exempted from the class required to have such license."
That the rule as announced by this Court is in accord with the weight of authority is apparent from the
authorities.
53 C.J.S. page 716, section 59a, says:
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"It is incumbent on a person whose right to recover
on a contract is dependent on his having been lie-·
ensed to plead and prove, as a part of his cause of
action, that he had fully complied with the requirements of the license law, or else to plead and prove
that under the corcumstances, the requirement was
not applicable and he was not required to take out
a license or pay a license tax ~ ~ ~ ."

To the same effect are the following cases: Kirkman
vs. Borzage, 150 P. 2d. 3; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 124
P. 2d. 835; Meinhard vs. Stillwell Realty Company,
169 S.E. 732; Maddox v. Yocum, 31 N .E. 2d. 652;
Rosenfield v. Jeffra, 1 N.Y.S. 2d. 388; Clark vs. Eads,
165 S.W. 2d. 1019; Swift v. Kelly, 133 S.W. 901;
Hoxsey vs. Baker, 246 N.W. 653.
FAILURE TO ALLEGE PERFORMANCE
Appellant further fails to state a cause of action as
he did not allege in his complaint that he performed all
of the conditions precedent in the contract required by
him to be performed, or the excuse of non-performance,
if any (Tr. 5, 6 and 7.)
In paragraph 3 of his complaint, appellant alleged:
plaintiff has duly performed his said agreement, has furnished all the material and done all
the work and labor as required for said agreement,
except defendant furnished one door, for which he
is entitled to a credit of $5.00, and except also plaintiff did not put in a wooden floor, for whom the
defendant is entitled to agreed credit of $150.00~ 4 4 .~'
"~ ~ ~

The appellant thus by his pleadings negatives his
performance. He admitted none-performance and yet
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he fails to allege the reason for such non-perfmmance.
That is, whether tt was waived or consented to by the
respondent.
The contract further provides that as to additional
work for which appellant is sueing that its "costs" were
to be determined by the parties:
0

0

0

Any additional work shall be paid for by
first party as parties shall hereto later agree upon,
and any alterations shall be paid for by first party
as extra work." (Tr. 6.)
"

The appellant nothwithstanding the provisions of
the contract requiring the parties to the agreement to
fix the cost of additional work or extras, failed to allege
the reason, if any, ~hy they did not agree to the cost
of such items. (Tr. 5 and 6.)
The law is that it is necessary in a suit upon a contract that the party declaring thereon must either allege
performance or an excuse for non-performance. The
Supreme Court of Oregon in the case of Ball vs. Daud,
37 P. 70, in a similar factual situation, held that where
a contract provided that in the event of alterations or
additions, the value thereof should be appraised by an
architect and that he should fix the amount that should
be paid for such alterations and additions. The Court
said:
"In Meyers v. Construction Co., 20 Or. 603, 27 Pac.
584, it was held that where a contract provided that
disputes arising between parties should be submitted
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to some certain person for settlement, whose decision
should be final, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff,
in an action upon the contract, to allege and prove
a compliance with that condition, or at least that
a reasonable effort had been made to comply with
the stipulation; and thus the distinction in Scott v.
Avery, supra, was established as the rule of interpretation in this state."
An then again the Court said:
0

0

0

The plaintiff having set out a copy of the
contract, and not having alleged a compliance with
its conditions, his complaint was ~emurrable. Myers
v. Construction Co., supra; 2 Estee, Pl. & Pr. (3d Ed.)
Section 3183. By answering to its merits, and not
pleading in abatement, it is contended that the defendant has waived her right to insist upon the provisions of the contract. The object of a plea in abatement is to show to the court some allegation of fact
that does not appear from the pleadings. Koenig
v. Nott, 2 Hilt. 328. The complaint having set out
the contract containing the provision to refer, the
Court was in possession of the fact, and there was no
need fo a plea in abatement. Failing to allege, after
setting out the contract, that the amount due had
been ascertained in the manner therein required,
the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit (Myers v. Construction Co.
supra,) and this objection is not waived by failure
to demur or answer (Hill's Code, Section 71 ) , and
may be urged on appeal (Evarts v. Steger, 5 Or.
147). The complaint not having stated a cause of
suit, the decree will therefore be reversed, and the
complaint dismissed."'
"
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It would thus seem that in this pa~ticular case, the
appellant for the reasons above stated has failed to state
a cause of action. Although he alleged performance he
qualified it without stating the reason for such no-performance, and particularly failed to state why the parties
to the agreement did not fix the cost for the extra work,
for which he seeks to recover.
FURTHER ANSWERING APPELLANT'S BRIEF
The appellant herein complained that although he
did not assign it an arror, the Court erred in refusing to
permit him to amend his complaint.
In this respect the record discloses that at the beginning of the trial the appellant requested the Court for
leave to amend his complaint, and that leave to amend
was granted. ( Tr. 43 and 44.) That thereafter the
appellant never requested or asked leave of the Court to
amend his pleadings, (Tr. 43 and 9.) from the instant
of the Court calling the case to trial until the dismissal
of the action. The record further discloses that the action
was dismissed on the 20th day of February, 1948 (Tr.
43 and 97) and that between this date and the signing
of the judgment and Dismissal by the Court on the 30th
day of March, 1948, the appellant did not ask leave of
the Court to amend his complaint.
Even assuming that appellant was in a position to
assign such as error it would appear from the amended
rules of Practice Rule 8 and from the decision of this
state, that the matter will not be considered by the Court
for the reason that it was not assigned as error.
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However, we would like to call the attention of the
Court to what we regard as a misapplication by the appellant of the Utah case of Smith vs. American Packing
Company, supra. The applellant cited this case as authority for the statement that the Court erred in failing
to permit him to amend. In the Smith vs. American
Packing Company, supra, the appellant requested leave
to amend and hte right was denied by the trial Court.
The court said at pages 959 and 960:
"The defects which we have mentioned are ~ot discussed by either the lower court in the memorandum
ruling or demurrer or in the brief of the respondent.
They are matters which ordinarily can be corrected
by amendment at any time prior to judgment without prejudice to the opposing party. In view of the
fact the amended complaint is deficient in essential
allegations, we would be compelled to uphold the
judgment of the district court if the court had merely
sustained the demurrer and had not denied the plaintiff leave to amend ~ ~ ~,
That the appellant is in no position to complain for
his failure to amend inasmuch as he himself elected to
stand on his pleadings. He at no time made any request
or asked leave of the Court to amend as aforementioned.
The appellant a] so assigns as error the Court's statement to counsel for the respondent «If you make a motion
to dismiss, I will grant it." That the Court was not only
within its province in making such a statement, but that
it was its duty to do so, is the holding of the case in
Hickey et. al v. Sutton, 210 N.W. 704, supra. This was
a case involving an illegal contract. The Court said:
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"If the objection be not made by the party charged
.it is the duty of the Court to make it on its own behalf. The Courts owe it to the public, justice and
to their own integrity to refuse to become parties to
contracts essentially violating morality of public policy, by entertaining actions upon them. It is the
judicial duty always to turn a suitor upon such a
contract out of Court whenever and however the
character of the contract is made to appear."'
Although the appellant did not assign as error, he
alleges in his brief that the Court erred in holding that
the appelleant was a contractor and was unlicensed. That
these were questions for the jury to decide. He claimed
that there was a dispute in the evidence. We again call
the Court's attention to the fact that this was not assigned
as error and that such cannot be taken advantage of
under the rules of this Court, even assuming that such
was error. However, we would like to call the Court's
attention to the fact that the evidence in this respect is
not in conflict. The contract was entered into on the
20th day of March, 1948 ( Tr. 5, 62 and 85), and counsel
stipulated that on this date the appellant did not have
a contractor's license. (Tr. 92 and 93). This is the only
evidence in the record as to the question of whether or
not the appellant did not have a contractor's license at
the date of the execution of the agreement, and that evidence is thus not in dispute. American jurisprudence in
this respect sets out the law to be as follows:
"12 Am. Jur. page 744, section 225:
Determination by Court or Jury.- Inveiw of the fact
that the sources of public policy are usually legislaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion and judicial decisions, the question whether a
particular agreement is contrary to public policy is
ordinarily to be determined by the Court, and not
by the jury. This is so at least where the facts are
conceded or not disputed.
We thus respectfully submit that in view of the
reasons heretofore set forth that the judgment of the trial
Court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

NEWEL G. DAINES,
L. DeLOS DAINES,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent.
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